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On January 15, 2020, the United States and the People’s Republic of China 
(PRC or China) signed Phase I of the U.S.-China Economic and Trade 
Agreement (USCTA), which suspended a two-year trade war between the 
world’s two largest economies.1 Proclaimed by the United States as a 
breakthrough, the USCTA contains commitments by China to purchase $200 
billion in U.S. goods and services and to implement substantial new protections 
for U.S. intellectual property (IP) rights.2 Aside from China’s purchase 
commitments, the most touted parts of the USCTA are China’s new 
comprehensive commitments on intellectual property and its new dispute 
resolution mechanism.3 The first two chapters of the USCTA deal exclusively 
with IP rights, with a focus on trade secrets and technology transfer.4 These 
provisions show a primary focus on criminal enforcement and also promote 
 
 
*  BA, JD, Yale University. Bazler Chair in Business Law, The Ohio State University Michael E. Moritz 
College of Law. Thanks to Thomas J. Schoenbaum for his helpful comment and to Natasha Landon, 
Moritz Reference Librarian, and Amy Pratt, Moritz 2L, for their assistance with this article. 
1  Ana Swenson & Alan Rappeport, Trump Signs China Trade Deal, Putting Economic Conflict on 
Pause, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 15, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/15/business/economy/china-
trade-deal.html. The formal name of the agreement is the Economic and Trade Agreement Between 
the Government of the United States and the Government of the People’s Republic of China, Jan. 15, 
2020, [hereinafter USCTA]. 
2  See USCTA, supra note 1, chs. 1–2 (“Intellectual Property” and “Technology Transfer”); see also id, 
ch. 1, § B (“The United States emphasizes trade secrets protection.”). 
3  Id., ch. 1. 
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enforcement through civil litigation and administration action.5 Under the 
Trump Administration, the United States has vowed to make enforcement of its 
IP rights a top priority.6  
As a matter of procedural law, the USCTA has created the ultimate 
enforcement weapon of IP rights for the United States.7 For more than two 
decades, previous U.S. administrations had relied on informal arrangements 
such as a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) and high-level dialogues to 
address U.S. concerns about protection for IP rights.8 The major flaw in this 
approach was that these arrangements lacked a formal dispute resolution 
mechanism and provided no means to enforce China’s promises.9 When China 
broke its promises to protect IP, the U.S. response was to enter into another 
MOU and only see this frustrating slow dance with China repeat itself.10 Under 
the Trump Administration, the United States has adopted a more bellicose 
attitude towards China that is embodied in the USCTA. 
In contrast with the informality of prior arrangements, the USCTA has the 
formality and structure of a treaty and contains a new and path-breaking dispute 
resolution mechanism.11 Under all prior U.S. trade agreements, the parties 
submitted disputes to a neutral and independent arbitration tribunal or to the 
World Trade Organization (WTO).12 Under the USCTA, no third-party tribunal 
has been established, and no recourse to the WTO is possible.13 The parties are 
to resolve disputes face-to-face. As Robert Lighthizer, the United States Trade 
Representative (USTR), has declared, “The only arbitrator I trust is myself.”14 
 
 
5   See generally id.; see infra Part II.A.1.d.ii. 
6  U.S INTELL. PROP. ENFORCEMENT COORDINATOR, ANNUAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REPORT TO 
CONGRESS 11 (2019).  
7  This does not mean, however, that the procedural weapon created by the USCTA is lawful under 
international law. To the contrary, the USCTA dispute resolution mechanism is in violation of several 
key tenets of the World Trade Organization’s General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and its Dispute 
Settlement Understanding. See Daniel C.K. Chow, A New and Controversial Approach to Dispute 
Resolution Under the U.S.-China Trade Agreement of 2020, 26 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 31, 53-55 
(2020). It would, however, be futile for China to file a complaint in the WTO because the United 
States has already disabled the WTO dispute settlement system. See id at 48. China’s obligation to 
purchase $200 billion in goods and services is also in violation of the WTO. See id at 33. 
8  See infra Part I.A. 
9  There are no provisions for dispute resolution in the 1992 U.S.-China MOU on intellectual property. 
See Memorandum of Understanding Between the Government of the People’s Republic of China and 
the Government of the United States of America on the Protection of Intellectual Property (1992), 
https://tcc.export.gov/Trade_Agreements/All_Trade_Agreements/exp_005362.asp [hereinafter 1992 
MOU]. 
10  OFF. OF U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, U.S. FACT SHEET FOR THE 27TH U.S.-CHINA JOINT 
COMMISSION ON COMMERCE AND TRADE – FACT SHEET (2016); David J. Lynch, Trump Signs Partial 




11  What is referred to as a treaty under international law can be either a treaty or an executive agreement 
under U.S. law. As a technical matter, the USCTA is an executive agreement that the President or its 
delegate, the United States Trade Representative (USTR), can enter into without the need for 
subsequent congressional approval. The dispute resolution provisions of the USCTA are contained 
in Chapter 7 of the USCTA, supra note 1 (“Bilateral Evaluation and Dispute Resolution”).  
12  Chow, supra note 7, at 35, 45. 
13  Id. When the United States enters into a trade agreement, the agreement may contain treaty 
obligations as well as provisions incorporating obligations under the WTO agreements. When a 
dispute involves WTO obligations, the parties may choose to resolve them either under the treaty 
dispute resolution mechanism or the WTO dispute settlement system. Id. at 42.  
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Under the USCTA, the United States has a unilateral right to declare China 
in breach of its treaty and WTO obligations.15 Moreover, under the USCTA, the 
United States also has the unilateral right to impose trade sanctions on China.16 
The USCTA forbids China from retaliating against the United States and only 
allows China the option of withdrawing from the treaty.17 If China withdraws 
from the USCTA, however, the United States could reinstate the punitive tariffs 
that created the trade war that the USCTA suspended.18 Once the United States 
finds China in breach, China will have to suffer tariffs no matter what it decides. 
The United States will be able to impose tariffs on China either by invoking the 
USCTA dispute resolution mechanism or by reinstating the tariffs that the 
USCTA suspended.  
If China finds itself trapped and seeks to raise a complaint in the WTO 
against the United States, China will find that such a recourse will be futile.19 
Before entering into the USCTA, the United States had already paralyzed the 
WTO dispute settlement mechanism, hurling the WTO into a life-or-death 
crisis.20 The WTO was made to suffer this grievous blow because it committed 
the malfeasance of repeatedly ruling in WTO dispute settlement cases against 
the United States.21 China’s only recourse is to go through the USCTA dispute 
resolution mechanism, which is under complete U.S. control, or to withdraw and 
suffer the consequences. The United States has boxed China into a no-win 
situation and has closed off all exits.22 
While the USCTA creates a path-breaking procedure for dispute resolution 
that has created a formidable weapon for the United States, the same cannot be 
said about the substantive provisions of the USCTA. For the USCTA to become 
truly effective, the United States must also have substantive provisions that 
address the major concerns of MNCs in IP enforcement through China’s legal 
system that were not successfully addressed by prior U.S. approaches. 
Otherwise, MNCs will continue to be frustrated in their day-to-day operations 
by IP violations and by hurdles to effective on-the-ground enforcement when 
using judicial and administrative authorities in China. While the USCTA is the 
ultimate enforcement weapon, using the USCTA means elevating a dispute to 
the bilateral level due to some breakdown in enforcement of PRC laws on the 
ground level. Elevating the dispute could result in trade sanctions imposed by 
the United States and the attendant increased tensions between the two nations. 
If the enforcement of China’s IP laws on the ground functioned smoothly and 
effectively, there would be no dispute that would need to be resolved on the 
bilateral level or otherwise. Ensuring the effective enforcement of China’s IP 
laws on the ground is thus a critical element to the overall success of the USCTA. 
 
 
15   Id. at 36, 59. 
16  Id. at 53. 
17  Id. at 36. 
18 See Trump: U.S. to Suspend Scheduled Tariffs After Reaching Deal with China, REUTERS (Dec. 13, 
2019, 10:41 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trade-china-trump/trump-us-to-suspend-
scheduled-tariffs-after-reaching-deal-with-china-idUSKBN1YH1T3; Thomas Franck, Trump Halts 
New China Tariffs and Rolls Back Some of the Prior Duties on $120 Billion of Imports, CNBC (Dec. 
13, 2019, 3:53 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/12/13/trump-says-25percent-tariffs-will-remain-
but-new-china-duties-will-not-take-effect-sunday.html. 
19  Chow, supra note 7 at 36. 
20  Id. at 36-37.  
21  Id. at 34-35. 
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At present, the USCTA contains an omission of one of the most important 
barriers to effective IP enforcement on the ground in China. MNCs have been 
plagued for years by systemic corruption by both government and business 
entities that create barriers to effective enforcement of their IP rights.23 Problems 
of corruption occur in different variations in both criminal and civil enforcement 
and when dealing with government or business entities. Problems of corruption 
are especially serious in three illustrative areas that are the focus of this article. 
First, in the case of the criminal enforcement of trade secrets—one of the 
primary areas of focus in the USCTA—issues of corruption by government 
entities are especially serious, as they arise at the threshold level in the criminal 
enforcement procedure.24 In addition, while all corruption issues create 
headaches, corruption issues involving enforcement of trade secrets is a “bet the 
company” type of problem because it implicates liability under the U.S. Foreign 
Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA), which prohibits bribes paid to foreign officials.25 
In response to demands for payments from PRC enforcement authorities for the 
performance of their services, MNCs routinely make these payments either 
directly or through private investigation agencies under the employ of MNCs.26 
While these payments may be tolerated by the PRC government, the U.S. 
Department of Justice (USDOJ) is an aggressive enforcer of the FCPA and could 
consider these payments to be illegal bribes.27 The USDOJ has its own mandate 
that is independent of the mandate espoused by the United States Trade 
Representative who championed the USCTA. An FCPA investigation is a major 
disruption of a company’s business, and the prospect of the draconian sanctions 
under the FCPA, which include imprisonment of company officers, is enough to 
create major waves of fear and anxiety in corporate boardrooms in the United 
States and other countries.28 It is ironic that the major protagonist for MNCs in 
enforcing their trade secrets might not be the PRC government but the U.S. 
government. 
Second, aside from the issue of illegal payments, China’s judicial system is 
notorious for the corrupt use by parties of ex parte contacts with judges in order 
to influence the result of legal proceedings.29 These types of ex parte contacts 
are commonly used and can be highly effective in influencing the result of an IP 
case.30 In most instances, the party will not approach the frontline judge directly, 
but will instead approach a higher level government official or a higher level 
judge that sits on the appellate court overseeing the trial.31 The party will ask the 
 
 
23  CKGSB Contributor, China Becomes Tougher for MNCs, But All Is Not Lost, FORBES (Sept. 10, 
2014, 10:00AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/ckgsb/2014/09/10/china-becomes-tougher-for-
mncs-but-all-is-not-lost/#3b6a04353648 
24  See infra Part II.A. 
25  See 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1 (2018) (anti-bribery provision). 
26  This practice is based on the personal experience of the author, who worked as an in-house lawyer 
for a large multinational company with substantial IP assets in China. The author has also discussed 
this practice with IP lawyers currently working in China. 
27 See Joe Palazzolo, From Watergate to Today, How FCPA Became So Feared, THE WALL ST. J. (Oct. 
2, 2012, 12:01 AM), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10000872396390444752504578024791676151154. 
28   See id. 
29  Jerome A. Cohen, A Looming Crisis for China’s Legal System, FOREIGN POLICY (Feb. 22, 2016, 
10:15 AM), https://foreignpolicy.com/2016/02/22/a-looming-crisis-for-chinas-legal-system/. 
30  Id.  
31  Xin He & Kwai Hang Ng, “It Must Be Rock Strong!” Guanxi’s Impact on Judicial Decision Making 
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higher level official or judge to exert influence on the lower level judge.32 
Skillful influence peddlers never use money, but rely on professional or personal 
contacts (or “guanxi”) with the higher level judge or official.33 Under current 
PRC law, such influence peddling falls into a gray area of the law; current PRC 
Criminal Law defines bribery as requiring the exchange of “money” or 
“property” and excludes the use of intangible benefits.34 The use of guanxi has 
a venerable history in China, long predating the PRC, which may be one 
explanation for why it is so prevalent.35 Many observers find that the use of 
guanxi is the most serious problem of corruption in the PRC civil court system.36 
There is a high probability that a defendant in an IP litigation brought by an 
MNC will attempt to influence the outcome of the case through ex parte contacts 
with the judge.37 
Third, in the case of the growing problem of counterfeit and infringing 
goods sold through the Internet, online counterfeiters frequently give business 
bribes to employees at PRC e-commerce platforms.38 In exchange, the e-
commerce platforms give  the operators, i.e., online merchants, favorable 
treatment such as the ability to delete negative consumer comments.39 
Employees at e-commerce platforms will also tip off internet counterfeiters that 
a complaint has been filed or that the counterfeiters are being investigated by 
Chinese authorities.40 One area where these illicit arrangements are most 
pernicious is registration. In exchange for business bribes, e-commerce 
platforms are notoriously lax in conducting entity registration and verification 
of new online operators.41 Instead, counterfeiters are allowed to use false names 
and addresses and can disappear into the “vast expanse of cyberspace” at the 
first sign of trouble—only to reappear in short order under a new name and 
address.42 This is particularly harmful because China has a sophisticated system 
of entity verification that if used properly can accurately identify, locate, and 
deter counterfeiters.43 The rigorous enforcement of these registration and 
verification requirements should have an immediate salutary effect in deterring 
counterfeiters who harbor a great fear of capture and arrest.  
Although these problems have proven to be intractable in the past, and 
although the current version of Phase I of the USCTA does not address these 
issues, there is still an opportunity to address them. The USCTA presents an 
unprecedented opportunity to address these endemic issues because the United 
 
 
32  Id. 
33  Id. at 841, 855, 864–65. 
34  See infra text accompanying note 167. 
35  See, e.g., SOCIAL CONNECTIONS IN CHINA: INSTITUTIONS, CULTURE, AND THE CHANGING NATURE 
OF GUANXI 3–20 (Thomas Gold et al. eds., 2002); John H. Dunning & Changsu Kim, The Cultural 
Roots of Guanxi: An Exploratory Study, 30 WORLD ECON. 329, 329–30 (2007). 
36  See Cohen, supra note 29. 
37  A recent study shows that litigants attempt to use ex parte contacts to influence the result of judicial 
cases in over half of all cases. See He & Ng, supra note 31, at 842. 
38  See Daniel C.K. Chow, Alibaba, Amazon, and Counterfeiting in the Age of the Internet, 40 NW. J. 
INT’L L. & BUS. 157, 181–82 (2020) [hereinafter Chow, Counterfeiting in the Age of the Internet]. 
39  Id. 
40  Id. at 182. 
41  Id. at 193. 
42  Id. at 186. 
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States can directly affect China’s domestic legislation through the USCTA.44 
Under the treaty, China has an obligation to implement legislation affecting the 
treaty provision or otherwise be subject to sanctions.45  
While Phase I of the USCTA has now been completed, the United States 
and China are in the process of negotiating Phase II to address some of the 
remaining and most contentious issues that were left out of the earlier 
negotiations.46 The United States could include new provisions to address these 
corruption issues as an amendment or revision to the Phase I agreement or by 
new provisions in the Phase II agreement. 
This article will proceed as follows. Part I examines the role of the USCTA 
in promoting IP protection in China. Learning from China’s past failure to 
follow through on its IP commitments, the USCTA allows the United States to 
unilaterally declare China to be in breach of its USCTA and WTO obligations. 
The United States can also unilaterally impose sanctions on China, whose only 
recourse is to withdraw from the USCTA. As a matter of procedural law, the 
USCTA provides every possible advantage to the United States. Part II will then 
examine major problems of government and business corruption in the IP 
enforcement process in three areas: demands for payments by PRC enforcement 
authorities, the use of ex parte contacts to influence the results of civil litigation, 
and the use of business bribes in e-commerce platforms that have contributed to 
an explosion in online sales of counterfeit products. Part III explains that the 
United States and IP owners still have the opportunity to address these 
substantive issues by supplementing the USCTA’s IP sections with effective 
anti-corruption provisions. Part III also proposes guidelines and suggestions for 
the drafting of these provisions. 
 
 
I. THE USCTA’S NEW APPROACH TO IP PROTECTION 
 
The first chapter of the USCTA deals with a group of longstanding IP issues 
that the United States has thrust to the top of its IP agenda with China. Chief 
among these issues is trade secret protection, which has emerged as the most 
urgent IP issue for MNCs in China.47 Other issues concern trademark 
squatting,48 a patent term extension to compensate for delays in the approval 
 
 
44  The USCTA creates direct obligations on China to enact domestic legislation. This obligation can be 
inferred from the language of the treaty. For example, Article 1.3:2 provides “China shall define 
‘operators’ in trade secret misappropriation to include all natural persons, groups of persons, and 
legal persons.” USCTA, supra note 1, art. 1.3:2. China has a duty to define “operators” as so 
prescribed in its domestic legislation. 
45  Id. 
46  See Jessica Bursztynsky, Trump Trade Advisor Peter Navarro Lists What the US Wants from China 
in ‘Phase Two’ Trade Deal, CNBC (Jan. 16, 2020, 8:14 AM), 
https://www.cnbc.com/2020/01/16/peter-navarro-lists-usdemands-from-china-in-phase-two-trade-
deal.html. 
47  See Daniel C.K. Chow, Navigating the Minefield of Trade Secrets Protection in China, 47 VAND. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. 1007, 1008 (2014) [hereinafter Chow, Navigating the Minefield of Trade Secrets]. 
For trade secrets provisions, see USCTA, supra note 1, arts. 1.3–1.9. 
48  USCTA, supra note 1, art. 1.24 (bad faith registration of trademarks). For a discussion of this issue, 
see Daniel C.K. Chow, Trademark Squatting and the Limits of the Famous Marks Doctrine China, 
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process,49 counterfeit medicines,50 and counterfeits sold on e-commerce 
platforms.51 Although the United States has complained about these issues for 
years, China has failed to make sufficient progress to appease the United States, 
leading the Trump Administration to adopt a radical new approach under the 
USCTA. 
 
A. APPROACHES UNDER PREVIOUS U.S. ADMINISTRATIONS 
 
Soon after China opened its economy to foreign investment from MNCs in 
the 1980s, the United States began to complain about problems concerning IP 
protection and enforcement.52 During this initial wave of foreign investment in 
MNCs in China, most MNCs sought to establish a joint venture with a local 
partner that could navigate the local legal and political environment.53 When 
MNCs establish a joint venture in China, the business entity begins as an empty 
vessel that must receive essential inputs in the form of capital and technology.54 
For example, when Procter & Gamble (P&G) set up its first joint venture in 1988 
in Guangzhou in Southern China,55 P&G also injected capital and transferred 
technology in the form of patents, trademarks, and trade secrets to the joint 
venture.56 The capital is used to purchase land-use rights, buildings, machinery, 
and equipment.57 At this point, the joint venture would have all of the physical 
structures and tools necessary to manufacture P&G’s products; however, the 
joint venture still needed access to P&G’s technology. Without access to P&G’s 
proprietary technology, the joint venture would lack the know-how to 
manufacture the shampoo, laundry detergent, and toothpaste that the company 
sought to produce and sell in China.58 In a pattern that would be repeated many 
times, almost as soon as P&G’s joint venture began production, illegal 
underground factories sprouted up nearby.59 These underground factories 
 
 
49  USCTA, supra note 1, art. 1.12 (patent term extension). For a discussion of this issue, see Daniel 
C.K. Chow, Three Major Problems Threatening Multi-National Pharmaceutical Companies Doing 
Business in China, 19 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 46 (2017). 
50  USCTA, supra note 1, art. 1.18 (counterfeit medicines); see Chow, supra note 49. 
51  USCTA, supra note 1, art. 1.13–1.4 (online infringement and counterfeits). For a discussion of this 
issue, see Chow, Counterfeiting in the Age of the Internet, supra note 38.  
52  See RAMI M. OLWAN, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND DEVELOPMENT: THEORY AND PRACTICE 71–
72 (2013); Bryan Mercurio, The Protection and Enforcement of Intellectual Property in China since 
Accession to the WTO: Progress and Retreat, CHINA PERSPECTIVES, July 2012, at 23, 24. 
53  DANIEL C.K. CHOW & THOMAS J. SCHOENBAUM, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS: 
PROBLEMS, CASES, AND MATERIALS 499 (4th ed. 2020). 
54  Id. at 503. 
55  Procter & Gamble Announces Joint Venture with China, UPI (July 6, 1988), 
https://www.upi.com/Archives/1988/07/06/Procter-Gamble-announces-joint-venture-with-
China/2947584164800/. 
56  The author was head of the legal department for P&G’s China operations and was involved firsthand 
in drafting joint venture agreements and in enforcing the company’s intellectual property rights. 
57  CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, supra note 53, at 503. 
58  Id. 
59  Daniel C.K. Chow, Anti-Counterfeiting Strategies of Multinational Companies in China: How a 
Flawed Approach is Making Counterfeiting Worse, 41 GEO. J. INT’L L. 749, 763 (2010) [hereinafter 
Chow, Anti-Counterfeiting Strategies]. While serving as in-house counsel for a multinational 
company based in China, the author determined that relatives or friends of employees at the MNC 









2021 2020 U.S.-CHINA TRADE AGREEMENT AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 188 
 
flooded the market with counterfeits and knock-offs of P&G’s products.60 
Problems of rampant counterfeiting and piracy arising from China’s opening to 
foreign investment in the 1980s led the United States to begin a Section 301 
investigation of China’s IP practices in April 1991.61 
In 1992, the United States and China entered into a Memorandum of 
Understanding (MOU) on the Protection of Intellectual Property to address and 
resolve these IP disputes.62 The MOU established an approach that the United 
States followed until the United States broke new ground with the USCTA in 
2020. Although the terms are used imprecisely, under international law, an MOU 
is considered to be an agreement that is less formal than a treaty, shorter in 
length, and is sometimes considered to be a general framework under which 
further agreements will be reached.63  As a reflection of the informal nature of 
the MOU, in 1995 China responded to U.S. demands in the 1992 MOU in a letter 
written to the USTR.64 After China joined the World Trade Organization (WTO) 
in 2001,65 the United States and China continued to work on an informal basis 
to deal with IP and other trade issues. During the first two decades of the new 
millennium, the United States worked on these issues through bilateral 
dialogues, including the U.S.-China Joint Commission on Commerce and Trade 
(JCCT) and the U.S.-China Strategic & Economic Dialogue (S&ED), to attempt 
to address some of the U.S. concerns.66 At times, the discussion on intellectual 
property in the dialogues would result in an agreement, such as the 2011 
Cooperation Framework Agreement signed in Chengdu, China.67 At other times, 
China would make specific commitments on intellectual property at the end of 
a round of discussions in the JCCT or the S&ED.68 
The most serious flaw in this informal approach is that commitments under 
the JCCT, the S&ED, MOUs, and other agreements lacked any dispute 
resolution and enforcement procedure. As a result, the United States was left 
 
 
60  XIAOWEN TIAN, MANAGING INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS IN CHINA 161 (2016). 
61 WAYNE M. MORRISON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., IF10708, ENFORCING U.S. TRADE LAWS: SECTION 
301 AND CHINA (2018), 
https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc1248239/m2/1/high_res_d/IF10708_2018Aug02.pd
f. 
62  1992 MOU, supra note 9. 
63  See generally Aaron Messing, Note, Nonbinding Subnational International Agreements: A 
Landscape Defined, 30 GEO. ENV’T. L. REV. 173, 188–90 (2018).  
64 People’s Republic of China Intellectual Property Rights Memorandum of Understanding—1995 
Action Plan (Feb. 26, 1995), 
https://tcc.export.gov/Trade_Agreements/All_Trade_Agreements/exp_005363.asp. The Letter 
contained an appendix containing a more detailed action plan to change to China’s IP laws. Id. 
65  See China and the WTO, WORLD TRADE ORG., 
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/countries_e/china_e.htm (last visited June 1, 2020) (“China 
has been a member of the WTO since 11 December 2001.”). 
66  OFF. OF U.S. TRADE REP., supra note 10; EXEC. OFF. OF THE PRESIDENT, STATEMENT ON BILATERAL 
MEETING WITH PRESIDENT HU OF CHINA, (2009); U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, U.S.-CHINA 
STRATEGIC ECONOMIC DIALOGUE (2009).  
67 U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND CHINA (2011), 
https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/11-1121.1-China-Trade-Inelllect-Property-
Rights-Cooperation.pdf. 
68  See OFF. OF THE U.S. TRADE REP., FINDINGS OF THE INVESTIGATION INTO CHINA’S ACTS, POLICIES, 
AND PRACTICES RELATED TO TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, AND 
INNOVATION UNDER SECTION 301 OF THE TRADE ACT OF 1974, at tbl.I.1 (2018), 
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/Section%20301%20FINAL.PDF (“China’s Bilateral 
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with no formal means of holding China to its commitments, which went largely 
unfulfilled. This process led to years of U.S. frustration: 
 
As is happening today, IP got injected into the trade process, 
but the waltz was long and slow. The USTR would complain 
of China’s failure to halt piracy of US-created goods; the two 
countries would enter into a MOU [memorandum of 
understanding] in which China would agree to clean up its act; 
three years later the USTR would identify continuing 
violations and come back and say, “this time we really mean 
it;” and the two countries would enter into another, more 
detailed MOU, and so on.69 
 
The United States’ dissatisfaction with China as it danced around its 
commitments was not limited to China’s IP practices but extended to China’s 
other trade commitments. The United States believed that China was not 
following through on its legal commitments under the WTO in many different 
areas of trade in addition to intellectual property.70 With the ascension of Donald 
J. Trump to the U.S. presidency in 2016, U.S. criticism of China took on a 
decidedly more bellicose tone. In 2017, U.S. frustration with China reached a 
boiling point, resulting in the following warning from the Trump 
Administration: 
 
For more than 15 years, the United States has relied on 
cooperative high-level dialogues to effect meaningful and 
fundamental changes in China’s state-led, mercantilist trade 
regime. These efforts have largely failed. Accordingly, the 
United States intends to focus its efforts on enforcement going 
forward. The United States is determined to use every tool 
available to address harmful Chinese policies and practices.71 
 
The United States had announced that henceforth in its relationship with China, 
it would forgo the carrot of negotiation in favor of brandishing the stick of 
enforcement. 
 
B. APPROACH UNDER THE USCTA 
 
True to its word, the United States adopted an enforcement-based approach 
to IP protections under the USCTA. The USCTA has the structure and formality 
of a treaty, not the relaxed approach of an MOU, and offers a radical new 
approach to dispute resolution and enforcement. The longstanding practice of 
the United States under prior trade agreements and bilateral investment treaties 
was to establish an independent and neutral arbitration tribunal that had the full 
 
 
69 Sharon Driscoll, Intellectual Property and China: Is China Stealing American IP, SLS BLOGS: LEGAL 
AGGREGATE (Apr. 10, 2018), https://law.stanford.edu/2018/04/10/intellectual-property-china-china-
stealing-american-ip/ (interview with Professor Paul Goldstein). 
70 OFF. OF U.S. TRADE REP., 2017 REPORT TO CONGRESS ON CHINA’S WTO COMPLIANCE 3 (2018), 
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/files/Press/Reports/China%202017%20WTO%20Report.pdf. 
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power to rule against the United States.72 Under prior trade agreements, 
whenever the dispute involved both a treaty and a WTO obligation, the 
complainant could choose to bring the claim either with the treaty arbitration 
tribunal or the WTO.73 
Under USCTA, no dispute resolution tribunal is established.74 The two 
nations are to resolve the dispute without the aid of a third party.75 If the parties 
are unable to come to an agreement to resolve the dispute, the complaining party 
has the right to impose trade sanctions.76 Although this right is available to either 
party, in practice, the United States will be the complaining party as all of the 
new obligations under the USCTA are imposed on China.77 In addition, the 
complainant must bring all claims, including those involving WTO obligations 
arising under the treaty, under the USCTA process.78  
The dispute resolution mechanism under the USCTA must be understood in 
the larger context of U.S. goals concerning the WTO dispute settlement system. 
On December 10, 2019, only about one month before the parties entered into the 
USCTA, the WTO dispute settlement system became crippled due to the actions 
of the United States.79 Due to U.S. intransigence in refusing to approve new 
members to the Appellate Body to replace retiring members, the number of panel 
members fell below that necessary to convene a quorum.80 As a result, the 
Appellate Body became paralyzed, and all decisions entered under the WTO 
dispute settlement system became effectively unenforceable.81 
The United States decommissioned the Appellate Body due to its 
malfeasance in repeatedly ruling against the United States. According to the U.S. 
view, the Appellate Body betrayed an understanding reached with the United 
States that it would rule strictly in accordance with the text of the WTO 
 
 
72  Chow, supra note 7 at 36. 
73  Id. 
74  See USCTA, supra note 1, at ch. 7 (“Bilateral Evaluation and Dispute Resolution”). The USCTA 
requires the establishment of a Bilateral Evaluation and Dispute Resolution “Arrangement” 
consisting of high-level trade officials from both parties. Id. at art. 7.2:1. No arbitration tribunal, 
however, is to be established. Id. 
75  Id. at art. 7.4. 
76  Id. at art. 7.4:4. 
77  A review of the USCTA reveals that all new obligations are imposed on China. At the end of many 
of the articles in Chapter imposing substantive obligations relating to IP, the article states: “The 
United States affirms that existing U.S. measures afford treatment equivalent to that provided for in 
this Article.” See, e.g., USCTA, supra note 1, at art. 1.3:3. 
78  There is no provision in USCTA Chapter 7, the dispute resolution chapter, for bring an action in the 
WTO. See generally USCTA, supra note 1. 
79  Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes art. 17.1, Apr. 15, 
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, 1869 U.N.T.S. 
401, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994); Ken Roberts, World Trade’s Demise Scheduled for Dec. 10, FORBES 
(Nov. 27, 2019), https://www.forbes.com/sites/kenroberts/2019/11/27/world-trades-demise-
scheduled-for-dec-10/#a1d1d292412e; Adam Behsudi & Finbarr Bermingham, The End of World 
Trade as We Know It, POLITICO (Nov. 20, 2019), https://www.politico.com/news/2019/11/20/world-
trade-end-donald-trump072257.   
80  Chow, supra note 7 at 38. 
81  Daniel C.K. Chow, U.S. Trade Infallibility and the Crisis in the World Trade Organization, 2020 
MICH. ST. L. REV. 599, 601, 610 (2020). A nation that violates any WTO agreement will be able to 
freeze the WTO dispute settlement process in its tracks so that any adverse WTO decision against it 
cannot be enforced. Once a WTO panel reaches a decision, the losing party can file an appeal to the 
Appellate Body. The WTO cannot adopt the decision until the appeal is completed which has now 
become impossible due to the paralysis of the Appellate Body. The decision is suspended indefinitely 
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agreements;82 instead, the Appellate Body engaged in unauthorized and 
illegitimate “judicial activism.”83 The USCTA offers a parallel dispute 
resolution mechanism under which the United States can resolve both USCTA 
and WTO claims against China.84 In an ominous development for the WTO, the 
USCTA indicates that the United States does not intend to repair the flaws of the 
WTO dispute settlement system, but to replace it with a process in new trade 
agreements that is under complete U.S. control.85 The United States has 
delivered a decisive two punch body blow to the WTO: the United States first 
crippled the WTO dispute settlement mechanism and then created an alternative 
forum to deal with IP disputes with China that it dominates and controls. 
The USCTA also offers an unprecedented opportunity for the United States 
to determine the content of China’s internal legislation. The USCTA creates 
treaty obligations on China that it must implement through domestic 
legislation.86 For example, Article 1.3:2 of the USCTA states, “China shall 
define ‘operators’ in trade secret misappropriation to include all natural persons, 
groups of persons, and legal persons.”87 Under the USCTA, China must enact or 
amend its laws to give effect to this provision or else be subject to trade 
sanctions.88 This treaty mechanism now allows the United States to directly 
address the endemic problems of corruption by requiring detailed and specific 
domestic legislation in China using textual language drafted by the United States 
as guidelines, an opportunity that has never been available in the past.89 
The result of the USCTA is that the United States has an uncontestable 
unilateral right to determine that China is in violation of its treaty and WTO 
obligations and to impose trade sanctions on China. Article 7.4:4(b) of the 
USCTA details this procedure: 
  
If the Parties do not reach consensus on a response, the 
Complaining Party may resort to taking action based on facts 
provided during the consultations, including by suspending an 
obligation under this Agreement or by adopting a remedial 
measure in a proportionate way that it considers appropriate 
with the purpose of preventing the escalation of the situation 
and maintaining the normal bilateral trade relationship. If the 
Party Complained Against considers that the action by the 
Complaining Party pursuant to this subparagraph was taken in 
 
 
82  Id. at 627. 
83  Id. at 627–31. 
84  Id. at 626–31. 
85  Id. at 635-36. 
86  Under U.S. jurisprudence, the USCTA is a non-self-executing treaty, i.e. a treaty that has no direct 
effect within the legal system of the parties. See CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, supra note 53, at 35. The 
parties must implement the treaty’s obligations through domestic legislation. Id. By contrast, a self-
executing treaty has direct effect within the domestic legal order of the parties and needs no domestic 
implementing legislation. Id. How does one determine whether the treaty is self-executing or non-
self-executing? The most common approach is to examine the intent of the treaties as evidenced in 
the treaty language. Id.  
87  USCTA, supra note 1, art. 1.3:2.  
88  This language that “China shall define ‘operators’” indicates that this is a non-self-executing treaty. 
Id. The text of the treaty clearly contemplates that China will fulfill this obligation through a domestic 
legal rule. If China fails to implement the obligation, then China is in breach of the USCTA. 
89  A detailed search of past agreements with China has not revealed any mechanism similar to this 
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good faith, the Party Complained Against may not adopt a 
counter-response, or otherwise challenge such action. If the 
Party Complained Against considers that the action of the 
Complaining Party was taken in bad faith, the remedy is to 
withdraw from this Agreement by providing written notice of 
withdrawal to the Complaining Party.90 
 
“Suspending an obligation” would include disregarding an agreed upon trade 
concession, such as the WTO tariff rate for Chinese goods as set forth in the 
United States’ tariff schedule.91 Once the obligation is disregarded or suspended, 
the United States can raise the tariff above the WTO rate. A “remedial measure” 
referred to above includes the imposition of trade sanctions, such as punitive 
tariffs (i.e. tariffs in addition to the WTO tariff), a complete trade ban of all 
goods, or a quota (i.e. a numerical restriction on import trade volumes).92 In 
response, China would be prohibited from taking retaliatory measures so long 
as the United States acted in good faith.93 China’s only option is to withdraw 
from the USCTA.94  
In the USCTA, the United States has now created an enforcement weapon 
for its IP rights against China that is far more potent than any that had previously 
existed. If the United States believes that China is in breach of any of the treaty’s 
IP provisions or WTO obligations, the United States can act unilaterally to 
impose trade sanctions on China. The USCTA forbids China from retaliating 
and allows China only the option of withdrawing from the USCTA. If China 
does withdraw, however, then the punitive tariffs that the United States 
suspended as a result of the USCTA could be then be reinstated. China is now 
trapped in a no-win situation in which punitive tariffs will be imposed no matter 
what China chooses to do. China is also boxed into using the USCTA to resolve 
its disputes as going through the WTO has now become futile. 
 
 
II. THE NEED FOR ANTI-CORRUPTION PROVISIONS IN THE USCTA 
 
While the drafters of the USCTA created a powerful enforcement 
procedure, they overlooked major problems in the substantive provisions of the 
USCTA. Consistent with the overall U.S. emphasis on enforcement, the 
substantive provisions of the USCTA emphasize enforcement, with a particular 






90  USCTA, supra note 1, art. 7.4:4(b). 
91  DANIEL C.K. CHOW & THOMAS J. SCHOENBAUM, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW: PROBLEMS, CASES, 
AND MATERIALS 88 (3d ed. 2017). 
92  The variety of trade sanctions available to the United States in a putative trade emergency are set 
forth in 19 U.S.C. § 2253(a)(3) (A)–(C) (1994) (describing tariff increases and quantitative 
restrictions). 
93  USCTA, supra note 1, art. 7.4:4(b). 
94  Id. 
95  The USCTA has at least seven provisions that deal with criminal enforcement. See generally, 
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A.  FCPA ISSUES 
 
The drafters of the USCTA’s criminal provisions left a significant gap in the 
treaty by failing to deal with the pervasive and intractable problem of corruption 
in the PRC criminal legal system that has burdened IP owners for years. For IP 
owners, the most significant issue concerning corruption in China is not with 
ramifications in the PRC legal system, but with the U.S. legal system; the major 
protagonist in legal issues involving corruption is not the PRC government but 
the U.S. government. Corruption in the PRC criminal enforcement system 
implicates the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act,96 which is enforced by two 
U.S. government authorities: the U.S. Department of Justice (USDOJ) and the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).97 
The anti-bribery provisions of the FCPA prohibit a U.S. company, its 
officers, and employees from making payments to a foreign official for the 
purpose of obtaining or retaining business.98 This provision is routinely 
implicated in the use of the PRC criminal enforcement system by IP brand 
owners. 
 
1. Payments to China’s Authorities in Trade Secrets Enforcement 
 
a. The Public Security Bureaus 
 
Under PRC law, the Public Security Bureau (PSB), China’s police, must 
initiate any criminal case by beginning an investigation, including criminal trade 
secrets and other IP cases.99 The PSB is charged with protecting PRC citizens 
from crime and in maintaining public safety.100 The PSB’s first priority is on the 
 
 
96  See generally, USCTA, supra note 1. 
97  Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78dd–1, et seq. (1977). The USDOJ enforces the anti-
bribery provisions, 15 U.S.C. § 78dd–1, –2, –3, and the SEC enforces the books and records 
provision, 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b). 
98  15 U.S.C. § 78dd–2 provides: 
It shall be unlawful for any domestic concern . . . or for any officer, director, employee, or agent of 
such domestic concerns or any stockholder thereof acting on behalf of such domestic concern, to 
make use of the mails or any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce corruptly in furtherance 
of an offer, payment, promise to pay, authorization of the payment of any money, or offer, gift, 
promise to give, or authorization of the giving of anything of value to . . . any foreign official . . . in 
order to assist such domestic concern in obtaining or retaining business . . .  
In outline form, the statute, 15 U.S.C. § 78dd–1, –2, –3, prohibits: 
(1) Issuers, domestic concerns, and any person 
(2) from making the use of interstate commerce 
(3) corruptly 
(4) in furtherance of an offer or payment of anything of value 
(5) to a foreign official 
(6) for the purpose of influencing any act of that foreign official in violation of his or her duty in 
order to obtain or retain business. 
The FCPA can present particularly treacherous issues for MNCs in China. See Daniel C.K. Chow, 
China Under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 2012 WIS. L. REV. 573 (2012). 
99  Zonghua Renmin Gongheguo Gong’an Xingzheng Chufa Fa (中華人民共和國公安行政處罰法) 
[Public Security Administrative Punishment Law of the People’s Republic of China] (adopted at the 
17th meeting of the standing committee of the Tenth National People’s Congress on Aug. 28, 2005, 
effective Mar. 1, 2006) art. 77, translated at https://www.cecc.gov/resources/legal-provisions/public-
security-administration-punishment-law-chinese-text [hereinafter PRC Public Security 
Administrative Punishment Law]. 
100 The Ministry of Public Security’s responsibilities are “[t]o prevent, stop, and investigate criminal 
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prevention and punishment of violent crimes, as these activities threaten public 
safety and security.101 As a consequence, the PSB views economic crimes, such 
as theft of trade secrets from wealthy MNCs or the sale of counterfeit products, 
as a lower priority.102 As the PSB perceives its primary role to protect society 
from violent crime, the PSB can be reluctant to pursue economic crimes where 
the only “victim” is an MNC with deep pockets that has suffered a financial loss 
that means lower profits.103 As a result, the PSB will usually ask an MNC for a 
“case fee” in order to initiate a criminal case.104 The case fee is framed as an 
administrative fee to cover the costs of the PSB’s investigation.105 For example, 
a criminal investigation might involve travel and expenses such as hotel and 
meals.106 As the PSB has a limited budget and its priority is on violent crime, 
the PSB believes that wealthy MNCs should reimburse the PSB for the cost of 
the investigation so that it will be able to have sufficient resources to discharge 
its primary duty to protect society from violent crime.107  
While the PRC has undertaken a well-publicized anti-corruption campaign 
for the past several years, the targets of this campaign are political enemies of 
Xi Jin Ping, China’s President and Chairman of the Communist Party.108 The 
targeted persons derive personal financial gain by accepting bribes, which 
allows Xi to remove them from office and punish them.109 A “case fee” made to 
the PSB is not funneled to the private bank account of any PSB official. Instead, 
it is made to the PSB’s coffers and used to defray its expenses in conducting the 
investigation.110 As a result, the case fee is a type of payment that is not the target 
of China’s current crackdown on corruption and is still routinely demanded.111 
Not only is the case fee routinely demanded but it is also usually paid by the 
MNC.112 This transaction now implicates the FCPA. The case fee is a payment 
to a “foreign official,” and a quid pro quo is involved.113 In exchange for the 
case fee, the PSB will initiate a criminal investigation.114  
 
 
others. Ministry of Public Security, P.R.C. STATE COUNCIL (Aug. 25, 2014)      
http://english.www.gov.cn/state_council/2014/09/09/content_281474986284154.htm.  
101 PRC Public Security Administrative Punishment Law, supra note 99, art. 1. 
102 Ministry of Public Security, supra note 100. The list of duties for the Ministry of Public Security do 
not even list economic crimes, indicating their relatively low priority. Id. 
103 This observation is based on the author’s own experience as in-house counsel for an MNC in China, 
as a legal consultant and expert witness, and on recent conversations with lawyers working on IP 





108 Daniel C.K. Chow, The Myth of China’s Open Market Reforms and the World Trade Organization, 
41 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 1, 34–35 (2020) [hereinafter Chow, The Myth of China’s Open Market Reforms]. 
109 Id. 
110 See supra note 103. 
111 Id. 
112 Id. 
113 The FCPA requires that the payment be made to a “foreign official.” See 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(a)(1). 
The quid pro quo is the exchange of money with the foreign official for a benefit given in return to 
the MNC. 
114 Case fees are not required by law. See generally PRC Public Security Administrative Punishment 
Law, supra note 99. Thus, the MNC cannot use the defense under the FCPA that the payment was 
lawful under the under the written laws of the PRC. See 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(c)(1) (affirmative defense 
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The last element of an FCPA violation is that the payment must be made for 
the purpose of “obtaining or retaining business.”115 This element is commonly 
referred to as the business nexus test.116 Even if the payment is a bribe to a 
foreign official, it is not an FCPA violation unless it is made for the purpose of 
obtaining or retaining business.117 In United States v. Kay, the Fifth Circuit 
rejected a narrow reading of the business purpose limited to obtaining or 
renewing government contracts.118 In that case, executives of American Rice 
Inc., a Houston-based corporation, paid bribes to Haitian officials to understate 
the value of America Rice’s imported rice to Haiti.119 By having its imports 
undervalued, American Rice paid significantly lower customs duties and sales 
taxes on the imports to Haiti customs authorities.120 While American Rice 
admitted that it made such payments, it argued that the payments did not violate 
the FCPA as they were made for the purpose of lowering costs, not to retain or 
obtain business.121 The district court agreed with American Rice and dismissed 
the indictment against it.122  
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit reversed and held that the facts of the case could, 
but not necessarily, support an indictment.123 The Fifth Circuit found that paying 
a bribe to foreign officials to lower taxes lawfully owed allows the company to 
reduce operating costs, freeing up capital that can be used to benefit the company 
in its business and to create advantages over competitors.124 For example, due to 
cost savings from lower taxes, the company could make a lower bid for a 
government contract to the detriment of its competitors.125  
A case fee given to the PSB could be viewed as having a business nexus 
under the expanded and flexible approach of the Fifth Circuit. By paying the fee 
to the PSB, the IP owner is able to induce the PSB to bring a criminal 
investigation against the suspected infringer or counterfeiter. In China, 
counterfeiters are interested in profits but are also extremely risk adverse and 
sensitive to brand protection efforts.126 They seek to obtain the greatest profit 
but at the lowest risk of capture and punishment.127 Once it becomes known 
among counterfeiters that a company is willing to aggressively pursue pirates 
through the use of the PSB, counterfeiters will migrate away from that 
company’s products to a different product that is not as aggressively defended.128 
For example, suppose that two MNCs, A and B, make successful and 
competitive brands of shampoo at the high end of the market that are 
counterfeited in large quantities. If Company A aggressively uses the PSB to 
pursue counterfeiters but B does not (or has not begun to do so), these criminals 
 
 
115 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(a). 
116 See generally Tiffany Lu, The Obtaining or Retaining Business Requirement: Breathing New Life 
into the Business Nexus Provision of the FCPA, 18 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 729 (2013). 
117 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(a)–(b). 
118 United States v. Kay, 359 F.3d 738 (5th Cir. 2004). 
119 Id. at 740–41. 
120 Id. at 741. 
121 Id. at 749. 
122 Id. at 740. 
123 Id. at 759–60. 
124 Id. 
125 Id. 
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will avoid counterfeiting A’s brand and begin to counterfeit B’s brands instead. 
Company A “retains” business by avoiding losses due to counterfeiting and also 
benefits by harming its competitors by shifting counterfeiting from its brands to 
those of its competitors. The USDOJ might consider these facts to satisfy the 
“business nexus” test as expounded by United States v. Kay. 
An even more problematic issue arises with respect to the practice of some 
PSBs in asking for a “reward” for each capture and arrest of a counterfeiter or 
infringer.129 As an arrest and detention by the PSB creates great fear in 
counterfeiters, MNCs always press the PSB for arrests.130 When faced with these 
pressures, the PSB will sometimes ask for a “reward,” i.e. a payment of several 
thousand dollars for each arrest.131 The PSB’s justification is that capturing and 
arresting a counterfeiter intent on evading capture is an intensive activity with 
higher costs that must be reimbursed.132 Under the FCPA, these payments might 
also be considered to be an illegal quid pro quo and might also satisfy the 
business nexus test as explained above. 
 
b. Private Investigation Companies 
 
Many MNCs in China hire private investigation companies to assist in the 
protection of their IP rights.133 Not only do these companies have experience in 
hunting suspects, but in some types of IP cases, such as counterfeiting, there are 
risks to the personal safety of the MNC’s employees.134 For these reasons, MNC 
will outsource this job to persons who are trained to do this dangerous work.135 
Private investigation companies are not strictly regulated by the PRC and thus 
can attract some nefarious characters who might be little different from the petty 
criminals that they pursue.136 In some cases, the private investigation company 
will pay the case fee to the PSB or other enforcement authorities.137 In addition, 
the private investigation company will usually not inform the MNC that 
payments have been made, but will submit an expense report to the MNC that 
disguises the payments as other innocuous expenses.138 
Using private investigation companies that pay case fees to PRC authorities 
will not immunize MNCs from liability under the FCPA. Section 78dd–1(a)(3) 
prohibits a U.S. company from making a payment to “any person, while 
knowing that all or a portion of such money . . . will be . . . given . . . to any 
foreign official.”139 The definition of “knowing” includes awareness that a 
“result is substantially certain to occur.”140 The use of case fees is well-known 
in the IP protection industry in China, and it is also widely known that some 
private investigation companies engage in blatantly illegal conduct outside the 
 
 
129 The author has personal knowledge of this practice, as he was present in a meeting with a PSB when 








137 See Chow, Navigating the Minefield of Trade Secrets, supra note 47, at 1035. 
138 Id. at 1037. 
139 15 U.S.C. § 78dd–1(a)(3) (2021). 
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purview of MNCs. Employees with the MNC that work with private 
investigation companies are likely to have knowledge of these practices. In 
addition, if the private investigation company is deemed to be an “agent” of the 
MNC, then the proscription of §§ 78dd–1(a) and –2(a) apply as the issuer or 
domestic concern is directly liable for actions committed by its agents.141 Under 
these circumstances, funneling payments through the conduit of private 
investigation companies would not immunize MNCs from prosecution under the 
FCPA. 
 
c. Accurate Record Keeping 
 
 In addition to its anti-bribery provisions, the FCPA also contains a 
books and records provision that applies only to issuers of securities under the 
Securities and Exchange Act.142 As many U.S. multinationals have stock that is 
traded on public stock exchanges in the United States, many MNCs are subject 
to the books and records provision. These provisions provide, in relevant part, 
that every issuer “shall make and keep books, records, and accounts, which, in 
reasonable detail, accurately and fairly reflect the transactions and dispositions 
of the assets of the issuer.”143 The purpose of this provision is to prevent 
companies from hiding illegal payments by mischaracterizing them or by 
omitting them altogether in their reports to their shareholders.144 
Under this provision, any MNC with stock publicly traded in the United 
States is required to disclose payments of case fees to its shareholders. 
Independently of whether MNCs have violated the anti-bribery provisions of the 
FCPA, MNCs that are issuers may also be in violation of the books and records 
provisions if they fail to record and accurately disclose payment of case fees and 
other payments (as further discussed below) to PRC officials. Failure to satisfy 
the books and records provisions could trigger an investigation by the U.S. 
Securities and Exchange Commission and lead to civil liability. 
 
d. Judicial Appraisal Authorities 
 
i. Criminal Cases 
 
 Enforcement of trade secrets in China involves special problems 
concerning the use of judicial appraisal authorities, which are state-owned 
entities that have the expertise to deal with the sometimes arcane scientific and 
technical issues involved in trade secrets.145 
In many criminal trade secrets cases, judicial appraisal authorities play an 
important role. Unlike in the case of counterfeit goods, it is not apparent to PRC 
authorities, such as the PSB, when a violation has occurred in the case of a trade 
secret. For example, if an MNC seeks to file a criminal counterfeiting case with 
 
 
141 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd–1(a), –2(a) (2021). 
142 15 U.S.C. § 78m(h)(2) (2021). 
143 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2)(A) (2021). 
144 See Kay, 359 F.3d at 758. 
145 See Decision of the National Standing Committee on the Administration of Issues Concerning 
Judicial Administration, arts. I & II (adopted at the 14th Session of the Standing Committee of the 
10th National People's Congress on Feb. 28, 2005, effective Jan. 1, 2006). Entities engaged in judicial 
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the PSB, the MNC will need to make a preliminary showing that a crime has 
occurred. All the MNC must do is display a copy of the trademark registration 
certificate issued by PRC authorities proving that it is the owner of the 
trademark.146 Then the MNC can display a sample of a counterfeit product using 
its trademark and submit a statement that it did not authorize the manufacture of 
the counterfeit. These two simple steps alone—that the MNC is the trademark 
owner and it did not authorize the counterfeit—will satisfy PRC authorities that 
an IP violation has occurred. In the case of trade secrets, however, making such 
a preliminary showing is far more complex. For example, suppose that an MNC 
approaches the PSB and claims that an enzyme formula used in making laundry 
detergent and protected as a trade secret has been stolen and is now being used 
by a competitor. Among other requirements, the MNC will need to show that 
the enzyme formula used in the competitor’s product is a copy of the enzyme 
formula used in the MNC’s own detergent.147 Even if the MNC has chemical 
studies purporting to show this result, the PSB is not qualified to review such a 
study. The PSB are enforcement officials who lack any formal training in 
intellectual property and the scientific knowledge necessary to read and 
understand any such offer of proof. Many other trade secrets could involve 
scientific, mathematical, and engineering concepts that are not accessible to 
ordinary law enforcement officials or to any persons not trained in these fields.  
Like other PRC authorities, the PSB has no interest in bringing a trade 
secrets criminal case that lacks a legal foundation and exposing itself to claims 
of exceeding its authority or abuse of power. In cases involving trade secrets, 
the PSB will often refer the matter to a judicial appraisal authority that has the 
expertise to conduct a scientific analysis and to conclude whether a trade secret 
has been copied.148 Once a judicial appraisal authority issues a report that the 
suspect has copied the MNC’s trade secret, the PSB can proceed with the 
investigation to determine whether a theft of the trade secret has occurred.149 
The PSB is now protected by the official report and cannot be charged with the 
unlawful exercise of its authority.150 
The problem lies in the judicial appraisal authority’s demand for a fee for 
its services. Like most state entities in China that perform a service, the judicial 
appraisal authority expects to be paid a fee.151 As the PSB has referred the matter 
to the authority to continue its investigation, the PSB should pay the fee, but the 
PSB will usually demand that the MNC pay the fee instead.152 Having already 
paid the PSB a case fee, the MNC is now expected to also pay the judicial 
appraisal authority for its analysis and report, a fee that should be paid by the 
PSB. In other cases, the MNC will first approach the judicial appraisal authority 
on its own, knowing that it will need to submit a report to the PSB before the 
 
 
146 This observation is based on the author’s own experience working with the PSB. 
147 See Law of the People’s Republic of China Against Unfair Competition (promulgated by the Standing 
Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Sept. 2, 1993, effective Dec. 1, 1993), art. 10. 
148 See generally Brian J. Safran, A Critical Look at Western Perceptions of China's Intellectual Property 
System, 3 U. P.R. BUS. L.J. 135 (2012). 
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151 Yi Xue, Trade Secrets 2020: China, CHAMBERS & PARTNERS (Apr. 30, 2020), 
https://practiceguides.chambers.com/practice-guides/trade-secrets-2020/china (referring to fees to be 
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PSB will take any action. To obtain the report, the MNC will also need to pay a 
fee to the judicial appraisal authority.153  
In these scenarios, the MNC could once again be viewed as “paying” for 
enforcement services. This scenario also takes on the appearance of the MNC 
paying for an official report that makes a finding in its favor. The outcome of 
the report by the judicial appraisal authority is critical to the criminal 
investigation because if the report finds that the trade secret has not been copied, 
then the PSB will terminate the investigation. In other words, the MNC is paying 
for the report but has a strong interest in a positive result. Once again, the MNC 
finds itself in a compromised position and one that might implicate the FCPA. 
If the MNC pays the fee to the judicial authority, it is paying for a report that has 
official legal authority and that may result in a ruling in its favor. The USDOJ 
might consider this payment to be an illegal payment under the FCPA’s anti-
bribery provisions. 
An even more unfortunate situation arises when the PSB or the judicial 
appraisal authority demands additional fees after the initial fees have been 
paid.154 The judicial appraisal authority might inform the MNC that it needs 
additional payments in order to complete the report.155 The judicial appraisal 
authority might claim that the analysis is more complex than anticipated and that 
more time and resources must be expended to complete the report.156 The PSB 
might make similar demands.157 The MNC is now under strong pressure to 
comply and begins to feel trapped and exploited by a series of never ending 
demands for payment. 
 
ii. Civil Cases 
 
So far this discussion has focused on the use of judicial appraisal authorities 
in criminal cases, but a civil proceeding involving trade secrets might also 
require the use of such authorities. Under the new burden-shifting rules of the 
USCTA in trade secrets cases, the plaintiff has the initial burden of making a 
prima facie showing that a trade secret has been stolen, at which point the burden 
shifts to the defendant to show that it did not steal the trade secret.158 Although 
the plaintiff might be able to show a prima facie case to the satisfaction of the 
court without the use of a report from a judicial appraisal authority, that might 
not be possible in cases involving complex claims and technical issues. The 
plaintiff might need to obtain a report from a judicial appraisal authority to 
satisfy its initial burden before the court. These types of civil cases could also 
involve payments by the plaintiff to the judicial appraisal authority for a report 
as part of its prima facie case. Once again, the payment might implicate issues 
under the FCPA. 
This discussion has been merely illustrative of the problems involving 
demands for payments by PRC authorities that plague MNCs. This Article has 
focused on the most sensitive and problematic demands, but demands can also 
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arise in many other contexts. For example, if administrative authorities seize 
counterfeit goods, the authorities may decide to store them in a warehouse and 
then later destroy them.159 The authorities might ask the MNC to reimburse the 
costs of storage and destruction of the goods.160 There appears to be a pervasive 
attitude among PRC authorities that MNCs have abundant financial resources 
and that they should therefore be expected to assume some of the costs of 
investigations and enforcement actions by PRC enforcement authorities, which 
have limited resources and different priorities.161 This is a pervasive and 
longstanding problem and can be manifested in many different contexts other 
than those used as illustrations in this section. 
 
B. THE PROBLEM OF EX PARTE CONTACTS IN CHINA’S CIVIL LITIGATION 
SYSTEM 
 
In addition to an emphasis on criminal enforcement, the USCTA also 
contains many provisions intended to strengthen civil enforcement through 
court-based IP litigation. In the area of civil litigation, MNCs in China have been 
plagued for years by the common practice of defendants exploiting systemic 
weaknesses in the PRC legal system by using ex parte contacts to attempt to 
influence the outcome of civil cases.162 This type of practice is not limited to IP 
cases, but applies in general to civil litigation. But as the USCTA was enacted 
to enhance enforcement through civil litigation—in addition to criminal 
enforcement—of IP cases, it is important to spell out these problems, as MNC 
plaintiffs are highly likely to encounter these problems in civil litigation over IP 
disputes. The discussion of the problems will also be helpful in a subsequent 
section of this article that will discuss remedial measures. 
Civil litigation in China is well-known to be plagued by problems of 
corruption. In 2016, Professor Jerome Cohen referred to it as a “looming crisis” 
and explained:  
 
Today there is a huge amount of popular dissatisfaction with 
the judicial system [in China]. . . . People realize the local 
courts are full of corruption. . . . Guanxi—the influence of 
relatives, friends, and contacts—is the biggest problem. Whom 
did judges go to high school with? Who is their cousin? Who 
is a friend of a friend? These questions permeate the system 
and often undermine fair adjudication. And, of course, political 
interference is pronounced. Local government or party 
officials, or members of the local people’s congress, use their 
low-visibility powers to adversely affect what might otherwise 




159 This observation is based on the author’s own experience with administrative authorities in enforcing 
IP rights in China. The author has also discussed these issues with lawyers currently practicing IP 
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In a typical case of most relevance to the present discussion, the party using 
guanxi is a defendant in a case brought by an MNC.164 The defendant or its 
lawyers will not approach the front line judge directly but will approach a 
professional colleague of the judge and one who holds a higher ranked 
supervisory position;165 in other cases, the defendant might approach a senior 
government or Party official.166 The higher level supervisor or official then 
approaches the frontline judge involved in the litigation and attempts to 
influence the outcome of the litigation. The defendant might also approach a 
relative or friend of the frontline judge. 
Although Cohen refers to using ex parte contacts to influence a judge as 
corruption, PRC law is unclear on whether using guanxi is illegal. In cases 
involving the use of guanxi by skillful practitioners, no money usually changes 
hands. Instead, appealing to a sense of professional obligation or a desire to help 
a relative or friend on the part of a judge is the motivation for favoring the 
connected party. Some type of return favor to be given to the front-line judge is 
expected in the future. Under current PRC law, the use of guanxi where no 
money or property changes hands appears to fall within a gap or a gray area. 
Under China’s bribery laws, influencing a judge through guanxi, even when 
there is a quid pro quo involving favors, is not considered bribery so long as no 
money or property changes hands. PRC Criminal Law provides: 
 
Article 389: Whoever, for the purpose of securing illegitimate 
benefits, gives money or property to a State functionary shall 
be guilty of offering bribes.167  
 
Article 385: Any State functionary who, by taking advantage 
of his position, extorts money or property from another person, 
or illegally accepts another person’s money or property in 
return for securing benefits for the person shall be guilty of 
acceptance of bribes.168  
 
These articles make clear that the giving or accepting of “money or 
property” is an essential element of the crimes of giving or accepting a bribe. 
Using non-monetary means to influence a judge or accepting a non-monetary 
benefit does not fall within the definition of bribery. In addition, there does not 
appear to be any other provision of law in China that explicitly deals with the 
use of guanxi.169 To the contrary, guanxi is deeply embedded in traditional 
Chinese culture that long predates the current regime of the Communist Party.170 
The existence of, and tacit acceptance or tolerance of, guanxi in China is one 
 
 
164 See HE & NG, supra note 31, at 863. 
165 See id. at 862. 
166 See id. at 846. 
167 Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xingfa (中華人民共和國刑法) [Criminal Law of the People’s 
Republic of China] (adopted by the Second Meeting of the Fifth Session of the National People’s 
Congress, July 1, 1979, effective Jan. 1, 1980), art. 389, translated at 
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168 Id. at art. 385 (emphasis added). 
169 The author conducted a review of China’s criminal, civil, and administrative laws.  
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reason why it is so pervasive, hard to eradicate, and creates a significant systemic 
weakness in the PRC judicial system that defendants often exploit. 
A recent study found that attempting to influence judges through guanxi is 
a common practice in the PRC. The study showed that 52% of PRC judges said 
that in handling cases they were approached by guanxi and that 61% of judges 
mentioned that within the scope of discretion, they favored the connected 
parties.171 Under the right set of circumstances, the use of guanxi can be very 
powerful and effective in influencing a frontline judge: 
 
The Chinese court is a hierarchical institution. A judge’s 
income and promotions . . . are to a large extent determined by 
her supervisors. A judge is under strong pressure to deliver if 
she is approached by someone who is in a supervisory position; 
in other words, that person has direct control over her in the 
bureaucracy. . . . The term “supervisor” goes beyond the 
immediate boss of the judge; it includes any officials within the 
judicial system who are in a position to assess the performance 
of the judge and thus affect her welfare and career prospects. 
Supervisors thus include division directors or presidents of the 
court. Supervisors can also include senior judges from the 
corresponding appellate court. These senior judges determine 
if a lower-court judge’s decision is reversed or remanded, 
either of which is a strike against her performance record. . . . 
Local administrative leaders and Party officials are responsible 
for the appointment and removal of court officials. Local 
officials in charge of powerful bureaus in the economic sector 
. . . also play “supervisory” roles as they have de facto control 
over the court budget and staffing decisions.172  
 
The number of persons who can affect the judge’s decision can be quite 
large so skillful influence peddlers in China can have a high success rate in 
influencing the outcome of litigation. In practice, many PRC law firms boast of 
their professional ties with government officials and will hire former judges in 
order to attract clients.173 The use of ex parte contacts and influence peddling 
and the longstanding tolerance of such practices in China is a serious systemic 
weakness of the legal system that is left unaddressed in the current text of the 
USCTA.  
 
C. BRIBES AND THE ONLINE SALES OF COUNTERFEITS 
 
 The USCTA recognizes that online sales of counterfeits worldwide 
through e-commerce sites have exploded and created a major problem for IP 
owners.174 Article 1.13 of the USCTA deals specifically with the requirement 
for e-commerce sites to have expeditious and effective notice and take-down 
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procedures for postings or webpages that sell counterfeit goods.175 Article 1.13 
is undoubtedly based upon frequent complaints from IP owners that e-commerce 
sites such as Alibaba and Amazon require IP owners to use convoluted and 
labyrinthine notice and take-down procedures that only add to their misery and 
frustration.176 IP owners have described these procedures as “Kafka-esque”177 
and their use as being imprisoned in “Amazon purgatory.”178 
 No prophylactic or enforcement measure in the USCTA, however, 
addresses the common problem of online operators who give business bribes to 
employees at e-commerce sites in China. Online operators in China pay bribes 
to receive preferential business opportunities that squeeze out competitors.179 
For example, in exchange for bribes, online operators are allowed to delete 
negative comments and post fictitious ones.180 Online counterfeiters also give 
bribes to employees who will then tip off the counterfeiters of investigations 
launched by PRC enforcement authorities.181 The common use of business 
bribes given to employees of e-commerce sites by unscrupulous online operators 
can undermine the implementation in practice of any of the new provisions of 
the USCTA. 
 The most damaging consequence caused by business bribes is the lax 
implementation of registration and verification requirements for online 
operators by e-commerce sites.182 One of the most intractable problems is the 
use of false names and identities by online counterfeiters.183 When IP owners 
attempt to take down a site or listing selling counterfeit goods, they find that 
registered names and addresses are fictitious and that online counterfeiters 
quickly vanish into cyberspace.184 
Due to China’s national policies that require extensive supervision of all 
aspects of Chinese society, China, ironically, provides the tools that would allow 
IP owners to identify and locate counterfeiters. For example, Article 23 of State 
Administration for Industry and Commerce (SAIC) Order No. 60, Measures on 
the Administration of Online Transactions (MAOT): 
 
The business operator of a third-party transaction platform 
shall examine and register as business operators the identities 
of the legal persons, other economic organizations or industrial 
and commercial sole proprietors that apply for access to the 
said platform for sale of products or provision of services, 
establish registration files and conduct regular verification and 
updating, and make public the information specified in their 
business licenses or provide electronic links to their business 
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licenses in eye-catching locations on its main web pages for 
business activities.185 
 
The business license referred to in this regulation is issued to every lawful 
business by PRC Administration for Industry and Commerce (AIC).186 Every 
lawful business must apply to the local administrative authorities for a business 
license and no business entity can lawfully operate without one.187 The AICs 
will review the application and verify its information before issuing the official 
license and registering the company as a lawful business.188 The business license 
identifies the correct name and location of the business operator and also 
includes the name of the business entity’s legal representative.189 Under PRC 
Company Law, the legal representative is a natural person who is subject to 
criminal and civil liability for the malfeasance of the company.190 PRC 
authorities wanted to ensure that a natural person could be held liable for 
wrongful acts of the company and that liability could not ultimately rest with the 
legal entity.191 By identifying the legal representative, the business license gives 
IP owners a natural person against whom they can bring a criminal or civil legal 
action in China independent of the remedy available by using the e-commerce 
site’s notice and takedown procedures. 
Each business license contains a unique eighteen-digit number known as the 
“unified social credit code”192 that is the business entity’s official business 
registration number.193 The number can also be used to search a publicly 
available national database to find the business license and registration 
information online, including the name of the registering entity, the entity type, 
and the region of registration.194  
If e-commerce sites accurately registered online operators, the information 
on the business license, such as the name and address of the business entity, the 
name of the legal representative, and the company’s unified social credit number 
will be available to the public as required by PRC law.195 Most counterfeiters 
hide behind false names and addresses for fear of identification and capture; if 
e-commerce sites rigorously verified identities by requiring the display of 
 
 
185 Administrative Measures for Online Transactions (promulgated by the State Admin. of Indus. & 
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business licenses on their webpages, many counterfeiters would be deterred 
from using e-commerce platforms to sell their illegal goods.196 Even if the e-
commerce sites only asked for the business entity’s 18 digit unified social credit 
code that alone would be a powerful deterrent. A review of recent webpages of 
sites selling counterfeit products indicates, however, that no business license is 
displayed and no electronic links to the business license are made available in 
direct contravention of Article 23 of MOAT set forth above.197  
At present, major e-commerce sites such as Alibaba are notoriously lax 
about and merely “pay lip service”198 to registration and verification 
requirements. Online counterfeiters pay business bribes to employees at e-
commerce sites to relax their standards, to ignore the requirements of business 
licenses, and to allow the counterfeiters to assume false identities and fictitious 
addresses.199 Without the ability to identify and deter counterfeiters, the 
effectiveness of the USCTA’s provisions enhancing the ease of notice and 
takedown procedures is undermined. Even if an IP is able to expeditiously take 
down an illegal site, the counterfeiter will in short order assume a new false 
name and address and repost the same listing. The simple act of prohibiting 
business bribes and requiring e-commerce sites to rigorously enforce existing 
PRC laws on entity registration and verification should have an immediate and 





As a matter of procedural law, the United States created the ultimate 
enforcement weapon in the USCTA. The United States designed the dispute 
resolution mechanism to box China into a no-win situation. Once the United 
States finds China in breach, China will have to suffer tariffs under the USCTA 
or if China withdraws from the USCTA, China will suffer the reinstated tariffs 
that the USCTA suspended. As a matter of procedure, the USCTA is innovative 
and path breaking; it is also clever and ruthless.  
By contrast, the USCTA’s substantive provisions have fallen short. They 
have failed to address the pervasive and systemic problem of corruption that 
creates barriers to on the ground enforcement in China. As this discussion has 
indicated, problems of government and business corruption occur in many 
different areas of the legal and administration systems and business sectors 
related to the protection of intellectual property. 200 The discussion in this article 
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hospitals. This practice is common because doctors in the public health sector in the PRC receive 
modest salaries and supplement their incomes by receiving these payments. The practice is tolerated 
by the PRC government as a subsidy by pharmaceutical companies to support underpaid doctors. The 
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has focused on some of the most serious and common problems, but corruption 
is capable of many variations and can occur in many different contexts. The 
common theme to all of these forms of corruption is the abuse of the PRC legal 
and administrative apparatus to obtain benefits through the use of money, 
property, or influence. These problems can create barriers to effective on the 
ground enforcement by MNCS in China that negatively impact the conduct of 
their day-to-day business operations. Moreover, they can expose MNCs to 
significant risks—not from the PRC government—but from the United States 
government under the FCPA.  
Fortunately, there is still an opportunity for the United States to address 
problems of corruption in IP protection. The United States and China are now in 
the process of negotiating Phase II of the USCTA.201 This negotiation will allow 
the United States to amend the IP provisions of Phase I or to add new provisions 
to Phase II of the USCTA. There will also likely be future trade negotiations 
where these issues can be addressed through new provisions. In drafting these 
new provisions, the United States should be guided by the following 
considerations. 
To address the demand for payments and issues related to the FCPA, the 
United States should insist on a provision that prohibits the demand by PRC 
authorities of all fees in exchange for the performance of their duties.202 This 
prohibition would include fees that represent reimbursement of costs or expenses 
used in the performance of their duties, whether these fees are styled as case 
fees, fees for tests, technical services, or as miscellaneous expenses.203 These 
new provisions are necessary due to an entrenched attitude on the part of PRC 
authorities that MNCs that have deep financial resources and can be expected to 
contribute to the performance of public services by PRC governmental entities 
that have limited resources. A more sinister attitude that may also exist in the 
PRC is that MNCs with deep pockets can be easily manipulated and exploited. 
Aside from protecting MNCs from liability under the FCPA, such a provision 
will also help relieve MNCs from the misery of being exploited by PRC 
authorities. 
The United States should clamp down on the use of influence peddling 
(guanxi) by inserting a clause that prohibits the parties from directly or indirectly 
engaging in ex parte contacts with judges in legal proceedings.204 The United 
States should also insist that China define the crime of bribery to include the 
exchange of non-tangible benefits to influence the result of a legal or 
administrative proceeding.205 At present, China’s criminal laws only include the 
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exchange of “money” or “property” in the crime of bribery, leaving wide open 
the opportunity to use ex parte contacts (i.e. using guanxi) to influence the results 
of legal proceedings without the use of money or property. The addition of a 
term also prohibiting the giving of “anything of value” should close this loophole 
in China’s anti-bribery law.206 The use of guanxi has an extensive history, long 
predating the PRC, which is endemic to China’s entire legal, administrative, and 
political system.207 It is also common in social relationships.208 A clear directive 
is required to prohibit its use in criminal or business litigation. 
The United States should also amend the USCTA provisions dealing with 
online sales of counterfeits by adding a specific provision that requires China to 
amend its criminal laws to prohibit online operators from giving and e-
commerce sites from accepting business bribes.209 A provision specifically 
limited to bribes in e-commerce is necessary to deter these practices.210 The 
United States should also include a provision that specifically requires e-
commerce sites to rigorously enforce China’s registration and verification 
procedures for online operators so that their true identities and locations become 
publicly available.211 These actions should have an immediate and positive 
effect in deterring online sales of counterfeit products. 
The current relationship between the United States and China is fraught with 
many issues and some fundamental concerns, such as the United States’ mistrust 
of China’s Communist Party,212 and are far too complex to discuss in this article. 
This article has focused mainly on the problems of IP protections raised in the 
USCTA that mainly affect U.S. multinational companies doing business in 
China. As a matter of procedural law, the USCTA has created the ultimate 
enforcement weapon that is under the complete control of the United States and 
that has boxed China into a no-win situation. With regard to substantive issues, 
however, the longstanding problem of government and business corruption 
creates barriers to effective on the ground enforcement of IP rights in China. At 
present, the United States has a rare opportunity through the continuing 
negotiations of Phase II of the USCTA to address some pervasive and intractable 
substantive legal issues that have long plagued MNCs in protecting their 
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